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I. ‘ANXIETY IS THE DIZZINESS OF FREEDOM’
1
: FROM THE WAR
ON TERROR TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS
Nearly 201 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the launch of the
War on Terror by President Bush in the United States (US) and globally,
emergency continues to remain a feature of liberal democracies. The War
on Terror has had a profound impact on rule of law values and institutions
in the US and around the world. In the past two decades, the two grand
ideological narratives of the post-Cold War era themselves seem to have
regressed: the universalization of liberal democracy and the consolidation of
the international legal order. Politics trump law in explicit ways in a global
context of acute commercial rivalry between the US and China. Wars against
the rule of law are also deployed in more subtle, pernicious ways – under the
garb, indeed, of the rule of law. Rule by exception has become a defining
feature of government in liberal democracies, lending renewed credence to
the oxymoron of ‘illiberal democracy’ as a label to characterize wide-ranging
phenomena – from democratically elected governments using law as a weapon
against the rule of law, such as the Fidesz party in Hungary, to the worldwide
prominence of ‘populism’ as a ‘new language’ and ideological platform for
political outsiders, from Donald Trump in the US to Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.2
The coronavirus pandemic that has spread across the world as we wrap up
this Special Supplement in June 2020 has added a new layer to these debates
by challenging the notion of crisis itself: ‘The metaphor of a war … has
∗ School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University, Law Building, Museum
Avenue, Cardiff, Wales, CF10 3AX
DezalayS@cardiff.ac.uk
1 D. Kennedy, Isabelle in the Afternoon (2020) 6.
2 The term ‘populism’ has generated acute ideological and political debates in which
(broadly speaking) its depiction as an all-encompassing label to characterize a common
sense of disempowerment and disenfranchisement and a quest for a charismatic
‘saviour’ (see P. Rosanvallon, Le Siècle du Populisme: Histoire, Théorie, Critique
(2020)) is opposed to the endorsement of populism as a political programme (see C.
Mouffe, For a Left Populism (2018)).
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overtaken the world. There is a feeling that governments need a freer hand
because we are fighting a war of some kind.’3 As Scheppele argues,
constitutionalists have generally not been so concerned about the emergencies
that are caused by nature … [b]ecause the cause of these emergencies is so
evidently not political, the timing is out of the control of leaders who might
benefit from them and the measures that are needed to address the problems
are so visible and evident, these have been considered the emergencies least
dangerous to constitutional government.4
Yet the pandemic has acted as an enabler to unleash already existing
authoritarian tendencies – from the arrest of journalists and political
opponents in India, to Bolivian authorities indicting political opponents on
charges of ‘crimes against public health’,5 to Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán
securing the passage into law of the so-called ‘Enabling Act’, which, just
like the infamous German Enabling Act of 1933, carries the potential of
unlimited executive rule by decree.6 By contrast, US President Trump or
Brazil’s Bolsonaro’s fraught relationship with truth and their denial of the
pandemic have been seen to echo their elective platform: a government by
chaos to ostensibly subvert institutions and the establishment.7
Elsewhere, executive responses to the pandemic illustrate the continuous
reliance on emergency as a modus operandi of government in liberal
democracies. In France, a brand new ‘state of health emergency’ law was
adopted on 23 March 2020, less than two years and five months after the end
of the two-year state of emergency triggered in the wake of the 2015 terrorist
attacks in Paris.8 On the other hand, the executive flip-flopping between using
scientific expertise and economic necessity to legitimate the governmental
response to the pandemic is continuously complicating and compromising the
view of the pandemic as an objective, apolitical crisis.
3 B. Paitnak, South Asia Director of Amnesty International, quoted in
J. Slater et al., ‘Under the Cover of Coronavirus, Governments Punish




4 K. L. Scheppele, ‘Underreaction in a Time of Emergency: America as a Nearly Failed
State’ Verfassungsblog, 9 April 2020, at <https://verfassungsblog.de/underreaction-in-
a-time-of-emergency-america-as-a-nearly-failed-state/>.
5 Slater et al., op. cit., n. 3.
6 K. Kovacs, ‘Hungary’s Orbanistan: A Complete Arsenal of Emergency Powers’
Verfassungsblog, 6 April 2020, at <https://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-orbanistan-a-
complete-arsenal-of-emergency-powers/>.
7 E. Peluso Neder Meyer and T. Bustamante, ‘Authoritarianism without
Emergency Powers: Brazil under COVID-19’ Verfassungsblog, 8 April 2020, at
<https://verfassungsblog.de/authoritarianism-without-emergency-powers-brazil-
under-covid-19/>.
8 S. Platon, ‘From One State of Emergency to Another: Emergency Powers in
France’ Verfassungsblog, 9 April 2020, at <https://verfassungsblog.de/from-one-state-
of-emergency-to-another-emergency-powers-in-france/>.
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II. THE RULE OF LAW VERSUS EXCEPTION, OR THE CONUNDRUM
OF LOOKING THROUGH A ONE-WAY GLASS
Emergencies kill constitutions. They damage them. They corrode their
resilience. Emergencies enable regime tilts from liberalism to illiberalism.
Debates involving constitutionalists and politics scholars have tended to
focus on the outcome of emergencies and their triggering role in fostering
democratic backsliding. However, they provide limited answers for making
sense of the enduring centrality of exceptionalism for contemporary politics
and the legacies of past emergency politics in the present. Foremost, what
role does law play – and with it, lawyers – in the emergence of situations qua
crises?
State reactions to the 9/11 attacks led to renewed interest in the question
of the state of emergency in Politics and International Relations (IR)
and in legal/philosophical debates, respectively. The War on Terror has
overwhelmingly been framed as a binary in which the rule of law and
exceptionalism are opposed, with a concern for the fragile balance between
security and the public order on the one hand, and civil and political rights
on the other. With discussions predominantly focused on whether a state of
emergency is inside or outside the legal order, this binary has been correlated
with a specific normative role attributed to law. It is either a deus ex machina,
an external variable to curb exception and foster the resilience of the rule of
law, or it is a tool at the service of the powerful, instrumentalized to subvert
the rule of law. The question of what law does to power is thereby subsumed
under a tension between law and exception – as an alternative between what
law ought to do to respond to extreme and political violence, and lawfare
through rule by exception.
The prominence of the Schmittian-Agamben vision of the political in
scholarly debates in the wake of state responses to the 9/11 attacks put
the emphasis on the rupture induced by emergencies and the potential
tilting of political regimes – from liberal democracy to its so-called nemesis,
authoritarianism. The ongoing surge of populism around the world – including
the tsunami of Bolsonaro’s election as Brazil’s President in January 2019
despite the uncritically acclaimed success story of the anti-corruption ‘Lava
Jato’ (‘Car Wash’) operation in the country – has widely been conceived as
the expression of a zero-sum relation between progressive globalization – as a
vision of historical progress articulated by (Western) liberal democracy – and
counter-globalization trends perceived as regressive: a pathway to illiberal
democracy, ‘competitive authoritarianism’,9 or outright dictatorship.10
9 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the
Cold War (2010).
10 Y. Mounk, ‘The End of History Revisited’ (2020) 31 J. of Democracy 22; J. Welsh, The
Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century
(2016).
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Yet the jargon of exception – as a political stance or an expression
of (scholarly) dissent – masks more than it reveals. The wide success of
Agamben’s synthesis in IR scholarship11 could arguably be related to the
fact that it provided the grounds for political dissent against the policies
deployed by US President Bush and continued by Obama. However, it does
little to explain either the relationship between emergency and exception or
the contradictions embodied by Trump – beyond the ‘crackpot’ representing
a ‘lunatic fringe’.12 To boot: while the caravan of the political jargon of
exceptionalism continuously moves, from terror to migrants to pandemic, so
too does scholarship have its own thematic swarming effects around trends
and buzzwords. Since the heyday of case studies on the global War on Terror
during the early 2000s, it is as if the War on Terror had no past nor legacy in
the present.
This framing not only appears problematic in the face of the endurance of
exception in contemporary politics, it also questions the very relevance of the
notion of exception itself, and its framing in opposition to the rule of law.
What Bigo and Bonelli call the doxa of the dichotomy between the rule of
law and the state of exception – due to its simplifying yet blinding clarity –
fosters a problematic amnesia that ignores the repeated reliance on states of
exception in the trajectory of contemporary liberal states in the Global North:
States of emergency are akin to the flowers that the lotus-eaters offer to Ulysses’
companions in The Odyssey. They tend to incapacitate us and make us forget
their earlier deployments. They affect our memory and erase the past and its
lessons. Each new state of emergency is presented as more severe than earlier
ones, more important than others, thereby justifying not only the application of
existing frameworks, but of something more, to combat a situation framed as
radically novel … Therefore, there is nearly never a return to normal after the
end of the crisis, no more than there is an inventory of what has been done. The
regime does not go back to its ex ante situation. Emergency leaves a permanent
imprint.13
Focusing on the routinization of emergency as a modus operandi of
government in liberal democracies provides a welcome shift of attention
towards the specificities of the logics of emergency themselves – beyond
the binary that would locate the latter either in the rule of law or in
the state of exception.14 Attending to what Foucault terms ‘dispositive’ –
that is, the complex assemblage of rules, bureaucratic apparatus, and executive
11 J. Huysmans, ‘The Jargon of Exception: On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence
of PoliticalSociety’ (2008) 2 International Political Sociology 165; D. Bigo and L.
Bonelli, ‘Ni État de Droit, ni État d’Exception : L’État d’Urgence comme Dispositif
Spécifique?’ (2019) 112 Cultures & Conflits 7.
12 Z. Williams, ‘Totalitarianism in the Age of Trump: Lessons from Hannah
Arendt’ Guardian, 1 February 2017, at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/feb/01/totalitarianism-in-age-donald-trump-lessons-from-hannah-arendt-
protests>.
13 Bigo and Bonelli, op. cit., n. 11, p. 8, my translation, emphasis in original.
14 Id.
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prerogatives that foster a street-level, daily administrative despotism – opens
up interesting paths. It points to fracture lines that continuously (re)produce
divides between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as a modality
of government – both in the synchrony of the intra- and inter-sectoral
adjustments fostered by the framing of situations qua crises15 and in the
diachrony, by tracing the genealogy in the long term, of the ‘dispositives of
security’ mobilized to respond to crises.
III. LAW(YERS): THE IRONIC BLIND SPOT IN THE NEXUS
BETWEEN EXCEPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
Nevertheless, the law continues to be conceived as an external, and
immutable, variable whose diverse effects are normatively weighed as positive
gains or negative losses. The role of the law is therefore conceived as a
functional dichotomy between rule by law and lawfare – as if the law remained
a kind of background, a given, static in its forms and equal in its effects. The
example of Judge Sérgio Moro, one of the lead prosecutors at the helm of
the Lava Jato anti-corruption campaign in Brazil who subsequently joined the
Bolsonaro government, presents a conundrum: is it a case of an individual
conversion, or does it characterize a new generation of legal professionals in
Brazil clustered in the spaces opened up by the fight against corruption yet de
facto aligned to Bolsonaro’s exceptionalist stance? This ahistoric, normative,
and value-laden function attributed to law can also give rise to political
dilemmas. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
lawyers involved in the first wave of law and development initiatives from
the 1960s to foster rule of law reforms in the developing world were quickly
confronted not only with the failure of these endeavours but also with the
contradiction of their own position as exporters of liberal legalist principles in
the face of authoritarian and militaristic backlash in Brazil and elsewhere.16
Part of the difficulty relates to the concept of the rule of law itself; as
Scheppele notes, ‘[t]he rule of law is one of the few political desiderata that
generate little opposition from any corner of the world. It compels so much
agreement because it is a famously fuzzy concept.’17 Law overwhelmingly
remains a black box in the Politics and IR literature. It provides an immutable,
ahistoric, and functional background to the dichotomy between the rule of law
15 See M. Dobry, Sociologie des Crises Politiques: La Dynamique des Mobilisations
Multisectorielles (2009).
16 D. M. Trubek and M. Galanter, ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States’ (1974) Wisconsin
Law Rev. 1062; D. M. Trubek ‘Living in the Contradiction: Globalization and Its
Discontents’ in Invisible Institutionalisms: Collective Reflections on the Shadows of
Legal Globalization, eds S. Ballakrishnen and S. Dezalay (2021) 241.
17 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists
Do Not Work’ (2013) 26 Governance 559.
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and exception. While a similar tendency characterizes legal scholarship, it is
compounded by a conception of politics as external to the rule of law. For
example, legal debates (in March 2020) about the adoption of new legislation
in France laying out emergency measures to respond to the spread of the
coronavirus pandemic focused foremost on the need for such legislation given
the already existing legal framework for emergencies.18 The entrenchment of
static dichotomies between war and peace and between ‘ordinary’ times and
exceptional conjunctures reflects a conception of the state of emergency as
either outside (through a coup) or inside the ordinary legal order. The state of
emergency is conceived as a set of temporary measures, generally codified by
the constitution – that is, as a modality like any other of the rule of law. It is
seen, therefore, in functional terms as a way in which to enable governments
to react to specific threats through a temporary transfer of power – from the
legislative to the executive – allowing for more efficient, rapid action. By
implication, the state of emergency is reduced to a temporary expression of
power in contemporary liberal democracies – with a priori no bearing on the
operation of the rule of law once the situation returns to ‘normal’.
Yet, while fostering the continuous appeal to the law as a response
to crises, this functional conception of the rule of law risks abstracting
the notion of crisis itself, as a problem external to the law. However,
as demonstrated powerfully by Ermakoff, the collective abdication of
representative democracy by the Parliament in 1940 in France could not be
explained, simply, by the objective threat of German occupation or ideological
pulls; it was, rather, the context of indeterminacy in which the vote granting
full powers to Pétain was taken that fostered this collective alignment.19
Beyond the question of whether the state of emergency lies inside or
outside the (ordinary) legal order, it is the invocation of the rule of law
itself for illiberal purposes, including in so-called liberal democracies,
that becomes problematic. Constitutionalists’ debates on ‘constitutional
resilience’ against the threat of populist authoritarian nationalism within
the European Union have tended to focus on legal or institutional changes
to decrease constitutional vulnerabilities and the need to identify potential
political backlashes.20 Yet apparently innocuous elements of the rule of law
can themselves produce illiberal outcomes. As Scheppele argues, focusing
solely on indicators – what rules are enshrined in the constitution, how many
judges are trained, who appoints them, and so forth – diverts attention away
from the monstrous outcome that can be produced by their interaction: a
Frankenstate.21
18 A. Lecatellier, ‘L’État d’Urgence Sanitaire: Une Innovation qui Pose Question’
The Conversation, 19 March 2020, at <https://theconversation.com/letat-durgence-
sanitaire-une-innovation-qui-pose-question-134078>.
19 I. Ermakoff, Ruling Oneself Out: A Theory of Collective Abdications (2008).
20 See ‘Constitutional Resilience Debates’ Verfassungsblog, December 2018, at
<https://verfassungsblog.de/category/debates/constitutional-resilience-debates/>.
21 See Scheppele, op. cit., n. 17.
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This normative understanding of the role played by law to foster the
resilience of the rule of law is correlated with specific normative projections
of the function played by lawyers themselves, qua agents of the rule of
law. Scholarship focused on the roles of lawyers in times of crises tends to
overwhelmingly construe them as legal heroes, as missionaries of the rule
of law22 – thereby reducing their less palatable roles as mercenaries at the
service of the powerful to anomalies.23 Yet, to take again the example of Judge
Moro, this leads to over-emphasizing the ratchet effects of the individual gains
enabled by emergency politics – thereby obscuring longer-term structural
patterns that could help to make sense of these as more than opportunistic
side effects. The risk, indeed, is to overlook contradictions that existed from
the outset and that are crystallized in the momentum of conjunctural crises.
Therefore, how can we go beyond the question of how law responds to
exceptional power and look through the looking glass of exception by tracing
what law does to power?
IV. BEYOND THE NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AS POLITICS
Those are precisely the questions triggered by Rick Abel’s monumental
volumes Law’s Wars24 and Law’s Trials,25 which offer the first comprehensive
study of the legacy of the War on Terror on rule of law legal frameworks and
institutions in the US. This is the reason why this Special Supplement opens
with a contribution by Abel, built out of these two volumes, as a point of
departure.
As Abel argues, the response by the US and the liberal camp to the 9/11
attacks was framed and legitimized through a reference to war, enshrined in
exceptional politics both at home and abroad. As his analysis testifies, this has
also placed exceptionalism at the core of contemporary US politics, not only
by stressing the limits of rule of law institutions but also by durably testing
their capacity for resilience. As an inventory of the impact of the War on Terror
on rule of law legal frameworks and institutions, Abel’s surveys constitute
a unique departure, in Law and Society scholarship, from the consensual
understanding of the relationship between the rule of law and the state of
exception as either a transient or an irrevocable dichotomy. The US response
to the War on Terror was institutionalized through rules escaping the rule of
law, but it was also operationalized through rules by exception within the remit
of the rule of law. Yet exception bears a cost on the present; if no inventory is
22 See T. Halliday et al. (eds), Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony:
The Politics of the Legal Complex (2012).
23 See, as a counter-point, A. Manji, ‘The Grabbed State: Lawyers, Politics and Public
Land in Kenya’ (2012) 50 J. of Modern African Studies 467.
24 R. Abel, Law’s Wars: The Fate of the Rule of Law in the US ‘War on Terror’ (2018).
25 R. Abel, Law’s Trials: The Performance of Legal Institutions in the US ‘War on Terror’
(2018).
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made to redress past wrongs inflicted on future generations, exception could
lead to durable attacks on the rule of law. Such is Abel’s bleak conclusion.
Abel’s narrative also gives pride of place to the role of legal professionals
themselves as a locus for maintaining the status quo, fostering resilience
of the rule of law as much as resistance. Yet his study is not simply about
legal heroism. Documenting precisely the elements of the rule of law both
individually and in combination so as to identify the factors that could lead to
and/or deter from attacks on the rule of law, his conclusions are sobering yet
optimistic. Just like his earlier volume on late-apartheid South Africa, Politics
by Other Means (1995),26 Abel demonstrates that law has consistently shown
itself to be more effective as a shield than as a sword. The most important
lesson, he argues, is therefore a paradox: the fate of the rule of law depends on
politics. That conjunctural politics have a variable influence on law’s response
to exception – depending on the majority party in Congress, or the party of
the president who nominates federal judges – underscores that defenders of
the rule of law must engage in politics, including the electoral process.
Such an apparently unlikely comparison – between the unpromising
environment of South Africa of the 1980s and the US’ vibrant, mature
democracy – prompted us to push the discussion further to ask: has the War
on Terror paved the way for the ongoing attacks on the rule of law that we
are witnessing today in the US and elsewhere in the world? Does the War on
Terror even remain a relevant yardstick to account for, and contrast, ongoing
attacks on the rule of law? Or should those be traced in longer-term structural
patterns? Built around Abel’s volumes, this Special Supplement stems from
a workshop organized under the sponsorship of the Journal of Law and
Society and the Cardiff Centre of Law and Society Annual Conference that
took place at the Cardiff School of Law and Politics on 30 April and 1 May
2019. It brings together an array of scholars hailing from different disciplinary
traditions across Law and Society and Politics/IR. As the Special Supplement
is published by a Law and Society journal, its first ambition is to push and
question disciplinary boundaries as a way in which to go beyond a focus
restricted to the dichotomy between the rule of law and exception.
V. FROM EXCEPTIONALISM TO CRISES AS BOUNDARY MAKING
Looking through the looking glass at law itself – that is, at legal frameworks
in their geo-political context and foremost at legal professionals themselves –
this Special Supplement asks what variables, in the synchrony and the
diachrony, help to explain the force of law in times of crises. Examining the
nexus between legality and crisis beyond the normative values attributed to
law demands breaking with scholarly convention in two ways.
26 R. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against Apartheid, 1980–1994
(1995).
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First, rather than looking at law’s response to exceptional power,
this collection posits the notion of crisis itself as a heuristic category.
Crisis situations are characterized by idiosyncratic dynamics as ‘fluid
conjunctures’27 that allow for intra- and cross-sectoral alignments and
disalignments, which are fostered by the more or less brutal transformations of
the social spaces in which individuals, institutions, and normative frameworks
are embedded. Crises may also provide an entry point to trace conflicts
and contradictions that existed before and that are reactivated in specific
conjunctures. The political invocation of crisis – that is, of emergencies
requiring a response – may align with or depart from these initial conflicts
and contradictions. As Abel argues, law’s force correlates more or less
strongly with political majority. By the same token, the crystallization of
legal responses around the War on Terror, the fight against corruption, or
other emergencies can strengthen as much as it can mask sectoral adjustments
within legal fields and in the structural relation between these social spaces
and national fields of state power. Focusing on crisis as a heuristic category,
therefore, provides a way in which to depart from conceptual yardsticks and
typologies, such as that of the rule of law versus exception, but also terms like
‘state capture’, ‘corruption’, and ‘illiberalism’ that are as much ideologically
laden as they both shape and are shaped by symbolic boundaries – whether
those boundaries are political or scholarly. Such terms, therefore, tend to
obfuscate their entanglement with policy pulls.
Second, this Special Supplement aims at unpacking the relationship
between the rule of law and exception by conceiving it not as a static
opposition – framed as an either/or – but as a dynamic one, by empirically
tracing processes of boundary making and their effects on the force of law.
Shifting the focus towards boundary-making dynamics is a way in which
to question and assess the embeddedness of the nexus between the rule of
law and political exception with historically bound values and their structural
impacts in the trajectory of legal evolution, that of the state, and beyond, in
relations of power between the Global North and the Global South.
This collection puts the emphasis on two processes of boundary making at
play in the relationship between the rule of law and exception:
(1) what (and how) claims to value are made through (the rule of) law; and
(2) how the relationship between law and exception maps onto political
liberalism/illiberalism.
Individually, the contributions adopt a micro or a more macro perspective,
attentive to the roles played by agency, specifically that of lawyers, or focused
more broadly on structural patterns. Collectively, this Special Supplement
explores these questions both in the synchrony and the diachrony, across time
and geographical scales: in judicial and bureaucratic responses to terrorism,
but also in the trajectory of the state, imperialism, globalization, and the
27 Dobry, op. cit., n. 15.
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current crisis of global capitalism and the nation-state. Through empirically
grounded analyses – focused on North American, Latin American, and
Western European as well as Sub-Saharan African contexts – this collective
endeavour provides a rich and nuanced understanding of how contemporary
manifestations of exceptionalism have their roots in historically entrenched
patterns. It expands the focus beyond the specificity of the post-9/11 anti-
terror politics in the US, Europe, and globally, towards a diverse range of past
and present processes across countries and regions in the world. This enlarged
geographical focus emphasizes that the structural patterns in which the rule of
law is embedded nationally are also defined by legal globalization dynamics,
which are rooted in colonial encounters and imperialism, and contemporary
dynamics of hegemony, driven foremost by the US.
VI. DE TE FABULA NARRATUR: THE STRUCTURAL AND
CONJUNCTURAL GAMES OF THE RULE OF LAW
This collection of nine papers brings together studies of ongoing political and
institutional changes (Abel on the impact of the War on Terror in the US;
Weill on Islamists’ terror trials in France; Mészáros, Engelmann, and de Sa e
Silva on the Lava Jato investigation and the ongoing populist surge in Brazil;
and Brett on the post-apartheid era in South Africa) and research on past
crises and their echoes in the present (Ermakoff on the demise of the Weimar
Republic in 1933, Massoud on post-colonial politics in Somalia, and Murray
and Wincott on border politics between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland following Irish independence in 1921).
Individually, the papers assembled in this Special Supplement tell
idiosyncratic stories. Relationally, they emphasize the relevance of combining
the diachrony and the synchrony to assess the force of law in times of crisis.
Weill’s ethnography of terrorism cases before French criminal courts provides
a direct sequel to Abel’s inventory of the impact of the War on Terror on rule
of law legal frameworks and institutions in the US. The judicialization of the
response to the problem raised by French citizens returning from Syria or
Iraq, where they fought as ISIS combatants, has positioned French national
criminal courts as transnationalized actors in the fight against terror. The
terror cases before the French Assize Court from 2016 have taken place
in a political context of repressive inflexion, fostered by harsh prosecution
policies. Yet it is also precisely the routinization of these cases in the normal
operations of criminal proceedings that has enabled the resistance of trial
judges – and with them the resilience of the rule of law – against this
repressive stance.
‘Of you the tale is told.’ The case of Brazil looms large in this collection.
In their respective contributions, Mészáros, Engelmann, and de Sa e Silva
tackle the apparently paradoxical outcome of the Lava Jato operation in
Brazil, which led to the victory of the militaristic and extremist Jair
10
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Bolsonaro in the presidential elections in 2019. Going beyond the populist
backlash explanation, the three articles unpack the diachronic and synchronic
variables that help to account for this outcome. Against the backdrop of
the celebration of the Lava Jato operation as a ‘success story’, Mészáros
traces the entanglement between politics/economic capture and law in Brazil.
The political economy of corruption in the state’s trajectory enabled the
efficiency of the Lava Jato operation but also played into what he calls
a trap of authoritarianism. In turn, de Sa e Silva and Engelmann focus
on the apparently contradictory positions of lawyers – specifically anti-
corruption prosecutors – such as Judge Moro, in this outcome. Engelmann
emphasizes the instrumental role played by international variables – foremost
US hegemonic influence in the legal globalization patterns at play in what
he dubs the expansion of the ‘catechism of the fight against corruption’. The
alliance between US think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
foundations, and a new generation of legal professionals in Brazil – co-opted
through US–Brazilian professional networks and legal credentials obtained at
Ivy League universities, as well as their proximity to elite business sectors
opposed to Lula da Silva’s Leftist politics – contributed to carving out a
new space of professional corporate legal practice aligned with the US’
aggressive export of compliance regimes both in Brazil and globally. The
autonomy of this legal anti-corruption movement was further strengthened
by the autonomous bureaucratic space institutionalized first during Lula’s
presidency and then during that of Dilma Rousseff, with a constellation
of administrative entities with prerogatives escaping federal hierarchies and
democratic scrutiny. Engelmann’s conclusion, therefore, is that rather than
a paradox, Bolsonaro’s election actually constitutes yet another iteration of
Brazil’s authoritarian pattern. Focusing on the conjunctural legalist grammar
used in the fight against corruption, de Sa e Silva tests the political efficiency
of the grammar mobilized by the Lava Jato lawyers. From initially invoking
the ‘enforcement of the law’ – notably the novel mechanisms of plea deals and
pre-trial detentions introduced under compliance legal frameworks – they also
pushed, curbed, and bent the rule of law by appealing directly to ‘the people’
before the tribunal of public opinion. As he emphasizes, the aura of Moro as
champion of the rule of law that expanded his symbolic status globally was
also capable of serving a government with illiberal predispositions, leading to
a sobering conclusion:
At a time when illiberal leaders are rising to power and there are hopes that
lawyers will protect and preserve a ‘rule of law’, scholars and policy makers
must recognize the slippery, indeterminate character with which this expression
circulates and the furtive, deceptive ways in which it can operate.
In turn, the contributions of Massoud and Brett respectively test the fate
of the rule of law in unlikely settings: in Somalia, dubbed a ‘fragile state’,
and in Zuma’s patronage politics in South Africa. Yet again, however, these
two settings reflect the influence of the US. So-called ‘fragile states’, argues
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Massoud, make unlikely candidates for testing the fate of the rule of law.
Law, indeed, is seen to be either absent or intermingled with violence. Yet
Massoud emphasizes the instrumental role played by religion in the symbolic
force and institutionalization of the rule of law in Somalia, thereby pushing
against Global North perspectives that see in religion the antithesis of the
rule of law. On the contrary, he argues, tracing the societal coalitions of
interests undergirding the force of shari’a rules in the historical trajectory
of Somalia provides a key to understanding the fate of the rule of law in
this country. While Siad Barre’s dictatorship developed out of a socialist
revolution underwritten by religion as a way in which to control the power
of shari’a religious leaders and religion itself as a source of popular dissent,
his regime crumbled precisely when he attempted to control the intimate
sphere of family relations. The prominence of shari’a courts in combating
warlords in war-torn Somalia from 1991 was quashed under the influence
of the US, however, in the name of the War on Terror in the post-9/11
international context. Yet Massoud concludes his analysis with the anomaly
of Somaliland – an unrecognized state that separated from Somalia precisely
by building a theocratic state out of an alliance between religious and business
leaders to fight against terror. In turn, Brett provides a direct sequel to
Abel’s Politics by Other Means. The case of South Africa loomed large in
the cultural Cold War. The mobilization of law as a shield against the rules
of apartheid, which contributed to the demise of the regime, was prompted
largely by US foundations whose funded projects in the country aimed to
foster the emergence of a new generation of lawyers for the transition. As
Brett argues, that law is more effective as a shield than a sword still largely
holds true in post-apartheid South Africa today. However, law as a sword
can also be two-edged. Brett traces how judicial responses to ‘state capture’
under Zuma’s presidency, through patronage politics clothed as an assault on
‘white monopoly capital’, contributed to Zuma’s downfall. Yet he also points
to backlashes against this judicial activism: ‘South Africa’s courts have …
become prisoners of expectations that they were obliged to create in order to
sustain the coalition against state capture.’ Indeed, judges are now subjected
to populist attacks: ‘The only new feature is that race has replaced greed as a
central explanation for the emergence of corruption.’
The collection closes with the contributions of Murray and Wincott,
and Ermakoff. These two contributions explore twin questions. Murray and
Wincott question the paradox of the resilience of the rule of law despite the
discontinuation of its territorial remit, that of England as a core in the narrative
about the United Kingdom (UK) as a nation-state following the creation of the
Irish Republic in 1921. On the other hand, Ermakoff asks: how can we account
for the use of law as an effective weapon to dismantle the rule of law? Murray
and Wincott look at the symbolic and practical modalities of boundary making
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Tracing dynamics of
border making ‘by bricolage’ between 1921 and 1972, a period of relative
normalcy before the outbreak of the Troubles, their analysis emphasizes the
12
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operations of petty officialdom of border making in the shadow of the three-
way relationship between London, the Irish Republic, and Northern Ireland.
Foremost, their study underlines how these operations unravelled within the
remit of a rule of law that remained defined as imperial through a symbolic
and implicit imaginary that served the political and economic purposes of
both the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Their contribution thereby points
to the crystallization effect fostered by the conjunctural contemporary events
of Brexit in imposing rigidity where previously pragmatism undergirded
by continuous, petty violence had operated. Ermakoff confronts the highly
contemporary paradox of democratic backsliding through law by revisiting
the National Socialist party leadership’s assault on the constitutional order of
the Weimar Republic in 1933. He posits this case as both exceptional and
paradigmatic, on the one hand due to the swiftness of the National Socialists’
takeover of the German state apparatus and on the other as an example
of the empirical class of regime transitions that revolutionary contenders
seek to bring about by using the legal resources of the Rechtsstaat. As he
demonstrates, the strength of the Weimar Republic as a Rechtsstaat was
paradoxically what precipitated its demise, as it allowed, in particular, for what
he calls ‘constitutional Trojan horses’ – that is, the use of law to redesign the
political game. Far from a paradox, the invocation and mobilization of the rule
of law for authoritarian purposes was not only explained opportunistically
by the ruling out of physical violence as an explicit strategy of power but
also proved to be more effective; the commitment to the Rechtsstaat by the
primary political opponents to the National Socialist party – foremost the
Social Democratic Party – is what eventually paralysed them and led to their
compliance to the takeover. Herein lies a powerful conclusion and cautionary
tale for the contemporary period. Rather than focusing solely on the outcome
of democratic backsliding and the consolidation, upstream, of the rule of
law, Ermakoff underscores ‘the need to pay close attention to the factors
conditioning the impact of legal claims in times of high contention’ – that
is, how the framing of authoritarian bids for state power as ‘legal’ affects the
possibility of collective action to counter them.
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